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INDEMNITY, LIABILITY, INSOLVENCY 
David Gray Carlson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose A has a claim against B ("^ v 5"). B has a claim over 
against C ("5 v C).' B, however, is insolvent and has not actually paid 
A. B's,  chief asset  is ,  in fact ,  BvC. To what extent can C claim that  B v 
C is valueless—^that B was not damaged because B is too broke to pay 
A1 
This question raises the fundamental legal distinction between 
indemnity and liability. If C has a duty to indemnify, C's duty is strictly 
contingent on 5's actual, historic payment of If C is liable to B, then 
^ V 5  is an element of the damages C owes B'mBv C? 
The distinction between indemnity and liability becomes important 
whenever B is insolvent. ^  And it is precisely here that the distinction is 
beginning to break down. The harbinger of meltdown is Feldman v. 
New York City Health & Hospitals Corpf where B had a contribution 
right against C. Contribution is like indemnity, in that the right is 
contingent on B actually paying A} In Feldman, B could not afford to 
pay^. 
In order to snatch from C the ignoble cover of 5's insolvency. A's 
lawyer {X) lent the amount oi A v B to B. In exchange, B issued a 
promissory note to X and assigned the proceeds of .5 v C as collateral. 
Newly solvent (or at least liquid), B paid A by check. A guaranteed X 
that X would be paid from the proceeds of 5 v C. As collateral for ^'s 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
' To conserve punctuation, I have eliminated the periods after "v" in the hypothetical cases 
of'U vfl"or"BvC." 
^ A V B would not be the only element in B v C. S can also recover attomeys' fees and 
related costs from C. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. MA^ Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 309 (2d Cir. 
1987) ("Where a breach of contract has caused a party to maintain a suit against a third person, 
courts have permitted recovery from the breaching party of counsel fees and other litigation 
expenses incurred in the suit."). 
3 It is also important for the statute of limitations in B v C. An action for indenmity accrues 
only when B actually pays A. An action for damages accrues when AvB comes into existence— 
a  t i m e  p e r h a p s  l o n g  p r i o r  t o  a c t u a l  p a y m e n t  o f  A .  
4 437 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1981), rev'd, 445 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981), rev'd, 439 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1982). 
3 See Klinger v. Dudley, 361 N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 1977). 
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suretyship obligation, A pledged to X the check B had written to in 
satisfaction of ^ v B. The pledge was accomplished by ^'s deposit of 
5's eheck in ^s fiduciary account. Assuming A's bank was the only 
bank involved in the transaction,^ then no funds changed hands ever. 
The whole transaction was financially meaningless.  Neither the bank, X 
or B ever surrendered control of any capital.' 
Nevertheless, the Feldman court held that A was "paid." A's 
payment vested B with a contribution right against C. C therefore had 
to pay contribution to B, even though B was hopelessly insolvent before 
the loan fi-om X. C's payment reimbursed X, which released Xs 
security interest in the fUnds used to pay A. Through the magic of 
secured lending, indemnity was transformed into liability. 
In this article, I argue for the "legal realist" position that, after 
Feldman, the distinction between indemnity and liability is, or ought to 
be, erased in any case where B is insolvent. If the courts can authorize 
the Feldman ploy, they can generally declare that A is already deemed 
paid whenever B has any kind of theory against C for either indemnity 
or liability, provided that a mechanism is in place for A actually to 
receive the proceeds of B v C. In effect, A has a security interest in .5 v 
C as a matter of law. No matter what 5's theory is against C, this 
relation should guarantee that C ean never benefit from 5's insolvency. 
This solution answers a contradiction that otherwise exists in 5's 
bankruptcy proceeding. The current view is that, in ^4 v 5, ^ is but an 
unsecured creditor in 5's bankruptcy. As such, A has only a pro rata 
claim against 5's bankruptcy estate.^ IfBv C depends on v4's payment 
or assurance of future payment, a certain infinite regress is generated 
that absolves C from paying. Suppose A claims $100 from B, but B is 
paying only 10 cents on the dollar in her bankruptcy. This implies that 
A will obtain only $10, which means that 5 v C is only for $10. Yet if C 
pays the $10, ^  will receive only $1 of this amount. This in tum implies 
that 5's cause of action against C is worth only $1. An infinite regress 
benefits C, until C's obligation to B approaches (but never reaches) 
zero. 
All this changes if the law recognizes A as 5's secured creditor, 
claiming 5 v C as collateral. In such a case, C must pay B $100, but 
these $100 are y4's cash collateral. A therefore ultimately receives $100 
from C via the mediation of B. Being fully paid, A departs from 5's 
bankruptcy proceeding. 5's other creditors are benefited by this, since 
fewer creditors remain to share the existing bankruptcy estate of B. The 
only one who loses out is C—as is appropriate. C should not obtain a 
® This is not entirely clear from the Feldman opinion, but most likely appears to be the case. 
1 This ritual was first suggested in Richard T. Farrell, Civil Practice, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
449,488-89(1978). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (2000). 
2004] INDEMNITY, LIABILITY, INSOLVENCY 1953 
windfall just because his victim is broke. Indeed, in many cases, it will 
be C's wrongful action that caused 5's insolvency in the first place. C 
should not be able to benefit just because her villainy was thoroughly 
devastating. The situation is rather like ancient tort law in which a 
defendant who severely injured the plaintiff had to pay, but the 
defendant who killed the plaintiff was off the hook. Wrongful death 
statutes were generated precisely to address this anomaly. Something 
similar is called for in the indemnity cases where the indemnitee is 
insolvent. C ought to be made to pay the full scope of her liability to 
B—^whether B survives or succumbs financially. 
This paper explores the possibility, given the current law, for 
courts to declare the distinction between indemnity and liability to be 
erased in the face of the pure possibility that B can always effect a 
secured transaction, where B v C is the collateral. In light of this 
possibility, A should actually be deemed a secured creditor in 5's 
bankruptcy. 
Any such exploration requires an examination of the legal premises 
of B V C. There are two theories relative to B v C. (1) C is an insurer 
and B is the insured. Pursuant to an express or implied contract, C is 
liable to or has a duty to indemnify B for A v B. (2) C has committed a 
tort against or breached a contract with B. A v B is then an incident of 
5's consequential damages. 
This article considers these two theories in turn, to assess the effect 
of B's insolvency, and the doctrinal possibility that A can be a secured 
creditor in B's bankruptcy proceeding, where .8 v C is yf's collateral. 
I. INDEMNITY 
A. Liability Policies Compared 
Suppose B wants to buy insurance from C. B and C benefit jointly 
if they agree that C does not have to pay B to cover yf's liability where B 
is broke. From 8's perspective, if B is broke and C must nevertheless 
pay, only A captures the benefit of the insurance. If B has no net worth 
to protect, what cares 8 if ^ is never paid? (We assume here a certain 
hardness of spirit in 8.) Meanwhile, C's exposure is reduced, and for 
this C can afford to offer 8 a lower insurance premium. Such a deal, 
trafficking in ^f's misfortune, is called an "indemnity" or "pay first" 
policy,^ because C need not pay 8 until 8 presents evidence that 8 has 
already paid A. Where 8 cannot pay, C is off the hook. Indemnity 
9 Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 706 F.2d 
1365 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). 
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policies are motivated specifically by the financial incentive of C to 
hide like a coward behind the insolvency of 5.'" 
Many states have intervened legislatively to prevent C from 
offering indemnity insurance. Aecording to New York Insurance Law 
section 3420: 
(a) No policy . . . insuring against liability for injury to person [or] 
property shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains in 
substance the following provisions or provisions which are equally 
or more favorable to the insured and to judgment creditors so far as 
such provisions relate to judgment creditors: 
(1) A provision that the insolvency or bankmptcy of the person 
insured. . . shall not release the insurer from the payment of 
damages for injury sustained or loss oecasioned during the life 
of and within the eoverage of such policy or contract. 
(2) A provision that in case judgment against the insured... 
shall remain unsatisfied at the expiration of thirty days from the 
serving of notice of entry of judgment upon the attorney for the 
insured, or upon the insured, and upon the insurer, then an 
action may... be maintained against the insurer... for the 
amount of such judgment not exceeding the amount of the 
applieable limit of coverage under sueh poliey or contract." 
In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis (In re F.O. Baroff Co.),^^ 
the court interpreted these provisions to mean that A was a secured 
creditor in 5's bankruptcy. In Baroff, C owed $100,000 under a policy. 
5's bankruptcy trustee, having already paid A $93,621, asserted the 
right to take this amount from the insurance proceeds and add it to the 
bankruptcy estate.  The Baroff court ,  however,  ruled that ,  since A's 
unsecured deficit exceeded $100,000, the entire policy should go to 
In short, A was a secured creditor in B's bankruptcy for the amount of 
the insurance policy. The above-quoted statute, the court ruled: 
was intended by the Legislature to mitigate the effects of an insured 
person's bankruptcy on those to whom the insured has liability 
within the scope of the policy, by creating in effect a trust fund of the 
insurance proceeds for the benefit of the injured person. Therefore, 
[A] acquired rights in the policy superior to [5's]...." 
Economists might be tempted to say here that an indemnity policy cuts out "free riders" 
like A who wish to capture the benefits of B's insurance. Or, altematively, they might say that 
indemnity policies facilitate the externalities B imposes on the public by imdercapitalization. Or, 
still altematively, economists might point out that A v B is based on jury awards which have 
nothing at all to do with the tme cost of.4's injury, so that no scientific prediction of social policy 
is possible in this (or any other) legal arena. 
11 This provision relates back to a 1909 enactment. Am. Bank & Tmst Co. v. Davis (In re 
F.O. Baroff Co.), 555 F.2d 38,41 (2d Cir. 1977). Where an insurance policy does not contain the 
clauses required by § 3420(a), the courts will read a policy as if the clauses were there. Id. at 41 
n.4. For a similar stamte, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3006 (2002). 
12 555 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
13 Id. at A2. 
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Proof of ^'s status as a secured creditor was the fact that New 
York gives A a direct right of action against C when C insures against 
t h e  p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  o f  B \  
By giving the injured person a direct action against the insurer, 
section [3420(a)(2)] clearly demonstrates that the fundamental 
policy underlying the statute is that injured claimants be protected 
against their injurers' bankruptcies; had the Legislature's concern 
been focused solely on the avoidance of windfalls by insurance 
companies, it could have provided merely that the proceeds of the 
insurance policy accrue to the bankrupt's estate. Moreover, section 
[3420(a)(2)] contains no suggestion that the Legislature intended the 
injured person's right of direct recovery from the insurance company 
to depend on whether the insured had also suffered loss in the 
transactions in question. Therefore, section [3420(a)(2)] leaves no 
doubt that, had [A] been able to secure a judgment against [5] prior 
to the latter's being placed in liquidation, [A] would have had rights 
in the insurance proceeds notwithstanding the insured's loss within 
the scope of the policy.'^ 
Baroff therefore does directly what this article advocates.^^ It 
reco g nizes yf as a secured creditor in 5's bankruptcy, and it awards B v 
C to as collateral.'^ 
14 At the time of the Baroff case, § 3420 was codified at 11 U.S.C. § 167(l)(b). 
15 Saro#, 555 F.2d at 42. 
15 Some aspects of Baroffhavt, however, come under attack. In Baroff, C issued a fidelity 
bond—C's promise to reimburse B if fi's employees caused losses to B. In Baroff, the court 
assumed that employee thefts from customers were covered. In short, the fidelity bond was held 
to be a liability policy. In 175 East 74th Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 416 N.E.2d 
584 (N.Y. 1980), the New York Court of Appeals ruled that fidelity bonds were not liability 
policies. Rather, they covered fl's loss of property due to embezzlement and the like. The court 
conceded that the policy covered B's liability to A when 5's employee stole A's property. Id. 
Nevertheless, the fidelity bond was declared not a liability policy, for some undisclosed reason, 
ylccorc/Anderson v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 826 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1987). 
17 Directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance stands on a different footing. Typically, B is the 
director and C is her insurance company. A is often the company of which B is director, and it is 
A that is the bankrupt. C has promised to cover B's liabilities, which means that, if A has a claim 
against B, A has a direct action against C. But C has likewise promised to pay B's legal expenses 
in ^ V B, and these expenses reduce the amount of insurance A can get. If A is bankrupt, ,4's 
bankruptcy estate has a security interest on B v C. Does B violate the automatic stay by taking 
part of B V C for B's own legal expenses? In Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In 
re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987), the court ruled no. A's 
interest in the policy was limited by its terms. Under the terms of the D&O policy, B could 
invade B v Cover the opposition of^. A's bankruptcy does not change this rule. See Feld v. Zale 
Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (C could not get a discharge from liability to 
B for bad faith settlement out of.4's bankruptcy); Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek), 51 F.3d 530, 534 
n.l7 (5th Cir. 1995) (C could give proceeds to A over the opposition of B, provided C acted in 
good faith). But see George Ong, Directors and Officers Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy: The 
Impact on an Estate and its Claimants, 13 BANK. DEV. J. 235 (1996) (arguing that B v C should 
be part of/l's bankruptcy estate). 
The situation is not imlike the circumstance in which O conveys a mortgage to A and then a 
mortgage to B. B files for bankruptcy, and O defaults. Does B's automatic stay restrain A from 
foreclosing on O, when such an act prejudices B? Most authorities say no, though this is hard to 
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By now it has become standard practice for bankruptcy courts to 
help A pursue C on 5's insurance, in spite of some apparent obstacles in 
the Bankruptcy Code. For example, New York and many states require 
A to obtain a judgment against 5 as a condition precedent to the pursuit 
of C directly.The bankruptcy courts have found a way to permit A to 
obtain a judgment against B even though B has technically been 
discharged. 
Here is how 5's discharge can be evaded to assure that C actually 
pays A. Bankruptcy Code § 524(a) describes the meaning of discharge. 
One of the principal effects is  that  an injunction exists against  A v B. 
But this injunction can be lifted, if equity requires. The court in 
Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix)}'^ for example, suggested that, at any 
time after discharge, A can return to bankruptcy court, long after a case 
is closed, to apply for modification of the injunction.^o Even more 
striking, the Hendrix court invited state courts to ignore the injunction 
under § 524(a) in awarding a judgment mAv B. Naturally, the bargain 
is that the discharge is waived only to permit the technical judgment to 
be entered. B, who is discharged, never has to pay anything in terms of 
liability or even defense costs.^' The bankruptcy court simply aids A in 
pursuing C directly.22 
justify in ordinary bankruptcy terms, in that the creditors of B might benefit from the appreciation 
value of B's jtmior secured claim. 1 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND 
CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 12.03 (2000). 
How is liability insurance different from suretyship? In suretyship, the guarantor is B not 
C. B V C is B's subrogation right against C if B is compelled to pay A. Still, A has a security 
interest in this subrogation right, as Bankruptcy Code § 509(c) proves. See 11 U.S.C. § 509(c) 
(2000). Suppose B (the surety) is bankrupt. Of course, C is principal obligor, and A can pursue C 
directly. C is often bankrupt simultaneously. Bankruptcy Code § 509(c) makes clear that B's 
subrogation right is subordinate to .<1 's direct right against C. This ends up amounting to precisely 
A s security interest in B v C. See David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent 
Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157,203-05 (2003). 
18 Galecor, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 729 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1990); 
Tillman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
19 986 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1993). 
20 Accord Green v. Welsh, 956 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc., 883 F.2d 
970 (11th Cir. 1989); Houston v. Edgeworth {In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 54-55 (5th Cir. 
1993) (injunction no impediment even though A filed no proof of claim in B's bankruptcy). But 
see Citibank, N.A. v. White Motor Corp. {In re White Motor Credit), 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 
1985) (giving this relief only to those creditors who filed proofs of claim). Why proof of claim 
has anything to do with such relief is a mystery. Why should C cower behind the insolvency ofB 
in the latter case but not the former case? White Motors is rightly criticized in Green, 956 F.2d at 
34. 
21 Greiner v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. {In re Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.) 
219 B.R. 716 (S.D. W.Va. 1998) (§ 524(a) not lifted where B had to bear legal cost of defense). 
22 This was not done in Freed v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 82 B.R. 9 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), where A, subject to discharge in B's bankruptcy, tried to bring a direct action 
against C. The Freed court ruled that A had not met the condition precedent of obtaining a 
judgment against B. Nor could A ever do so, because B had been discharged in bankruptcy. Id. at 
12 (referring to "the finality inherent in the permanent [discharge] injunction"). Under Hendrix, 
however, A could revive her rights against C by bringing a post-discharge action against B, 
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This ad hoc system works well enough when A is the only creditor 
of B with rights against C, and where multiple ^s are not pursuing C's 
policy obligation to B. This is the era of mass torts, however, and it is 
now the custom for insurance proceeds to run out before the As are fully 
paid. Courts have improvised here, too. While the basic rule from state 
law is the "rustic"" one of "first come first served,"" even state courts 
have found occasion to impose pro rata sharing on a surfeit of As, in 
certain circumstances. In particular, where numerous As join in a law 
suit against C, and where the claims exceed B v C, courts have ordered 
pro rata sharing.^^ Given this instinct at state law, it has proved an easy 
thing for the bankruptcy courts to institute pro rata sharing among the 
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts have taken charge of the insurance 
proceeds from C, labeling it property of the estate,^'' and have 
administered this fund on behalf of a subset of B's creditors who are 
covered by this policyAlthough courts have not yet articulated the 
ground on which bankruptcy should administer a special fund for the 
benefit of only a subset of 5's creditors, such ground can easily be 
located in Bankruptcy Code § 725. Section 725 is the all-important 
provision which states that secured creditors are entitled to receive 
collateral before the unsecured creditors receive distributions of the 
bankruptcy estate. According to § 725: 
After the commencement of a case under this chapter, but before 
final distribution of property of the estate under section 726 of this 
title, the tmstee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any 
property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest, such 
thereby vesting a right against C. 
23 Robert Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims, 70 HARV. L. REV. 
27, 38 (1956). 
24 Negron v. Everady Ins. Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); see also Hartford 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dodd, 416 F. Supp. I2I6 (D. Md. 1976) (Delaware law). Dodd, however, 
involved, in part, a special right of passenger's in B's car. Delaware law prevents C from 
favoring B over A, when A is a passenger. In Dodd, C did not warn A that C would pay B, 
thereby exhausting the policy. C therefore had a duty to withhold payments to B once C became 
informed of A's claim. 
25 Keeton, supra note 23; Note, Pro-rating Automobile Liability Insurance to Multiple 
Claimants, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1965); V.H. Cooper, Annotation, Basis and Manner of 
Distribution Among Multiple Claimants of Proceeds of Liability Insurance Policy Inadequate to 
Pay All Claims in Full, 70 A.L.R.2d 416 (1960). 
26 See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 
373 (1989). 
22 E.g., Minoco Group of Cos., Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New England, 799 
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1986) (automatic stay prevents cancellation of policy since policy was property 
of the estate); A.H. Robbins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986). But see Houston 
v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1993) (asserting that the policy is, but the 
proceeds of the policy are not, property of the bankruptcy estate). The Fifth Circuit has backed 
off from the distinction between the policy itself and proceeds of the policy. See Homsy v. Floyd 
(In re Vitek), 51 F.3d 530, 534 n.l7 (5th Cir. 1995). 
28 MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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as a lien, and that has not been disposed of under another section of 
this title. 
If all the As claiming insurance proceeds from C are conceived as 
secured creditors of B, then § 725 comfortably applies to justify 
bankruptcy administration of insurance proceeds. That they should 
share pro rata, however, is not established in § 725, but can be borrowed 
from existing state law instincts. 
The Johns-Manville case has been prominent in establishing the 
power of a bankruptcy court to administer insurance proceeds. In 
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp.P the Second Circuit approved 
of a plan whereby insurance proceeds, plus other contributions, were 
given to a trust for distribution to all the As who were covered by the 
C's insurance policies. The bankruptcy court then issued an injunction 
barring any A from suing C. This injunction has proved controversial, 
and it is sometimes denounced as an overreaching attempt to give C a 
discharge out of B's bankruptcy.^" Yet, once it is recognized that 
insurance proceeds are simply collateral  for  ^ ' s  security interest  in B's 
bankruptcy, Manville injunctions do not seem controversial at all. The 
automatic stay itself should protect C and C's proceeds, since these 
proceeds are property of the bankruptcy estate. The Manville injunction 
also included a declaration that C's payment exhausted C's liability to B 
and hence to any A, but there is nothing extraordinary about this. 
Whenever B has a payment intangible on which a creditor claims a lien, 
it can be expected that B's bankruptcy trustee and the account debtor 
{€) might settle on a payment extinguishing the account.^' Manville 
does not seem unusual in this respect.^^ 
29 837 F.2d at 92 (2d Cir. 1988). 
20 In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); Ralph Brubaker, 
Nondebtor Release and Injunctions in Chapter II: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts and the 
Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1998); G. Marcus Cole, A Calculus 
Without Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party 
Non-Debtor "Discharge", 84 IOWA L. REV. 753 (1999); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting 
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter II Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
235, 268 (2002). 
31 Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Valdez, 709 P.2d 1233,1236 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
32 On the other hand, the injunction in Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th 
Cir. 1995), did overreach and was properly overruled. In Zale, A was bankrupt. A had bought 
D&O insurance for B, and the bankruptcy court permanently enjoined any lawsuits against C by 
B or by C's excess insurers. If the injunction had been limited to proceeds of C's insurance 
policy covering Av B,\t. might have survived scrutiny. Id. Since A was a secured creditor of B 
and had a right to collect Av B directly from C, these proceeds can be viewed as property of yJ's 
bankruptcy estate. C's injunctive protection, however, exceeded protection of ^'s bankruptcy 
estate. It prevented any suit by B or the excess insurers, whether part of the proceeds of the 
policy or not. B or the excess insurers might have claims against C personally that are entirely 
distinct from C's contractual obligation to pay to B (and hence to A) the amount of ,4 v B. See 
John F. O'Connor, Insurance Coverage Settlement and the Rights of Excess Insurers, 62 MD. L. 
REV. 30 (2003). Why should they be prevented from bringing these actions, since they did not 
affect property of the estate? 
2004] INDEMNITY, LIABILITY, INSOLVENCY 1959 
Of course, § 725 is a chapter 7 rule only, not a chapter 11 rule. 
Nevertheless, it applies indirectly in chapter 11 cases. At least when a 
plan is actually confirmed, it must give every creditor at least what she 
would have received in chapter IP This provision in effect 
incorporates § 725 by reference. A harder case posed by the popular 
practice of conducting asset sales pursuant to § 363(b), even though no 
chapter 11 plan is in the offing.^'' Such cases may never culminate in a 
confirmed plan. Nor is it clear that they are headed for chapter 7. 
Nevertheless, in both chapter 11 and chapter 7, § 725 is ineluctable, and 
courts have had no trouble finding the authority to split up C's 
insurance proceeds equally among all the ^s.^^ 
Baroff stands for the proposition that is a secured creditor of B 
with a claim onBv C. Does this mean that, when A obtains a judgment 
against B shortly before 5's bankruptcy, A has received a voidable 
preference? Apparently not, by ancient fiat of the Supreme Court, 
which, without sharing its analysis, simply declared the scheme to be 
consistent with bankruptcy law.^® But this point can be explained by the 
fact that A's lien against B v C is a statutory lien. Statutory liens are 
never voidable preferences." Statutory liens are themselves voidable if 
a bona fide purchaser of 5 v C could take a senior interest," but this 
hardly seems possible. If B sold B v Cio X, a bona fide purchaser, C 
undoubtedly would still be liable to A. This is precisely what it means 
to say that A has a security interest in B v C. No bona fide purchaser 
can claim ignorance of A's security interest when A v B is the very 
c o n t e n t  o f B  v  C .  
Still, the Baroff concept undoubtedly creates intractable problems. 
If every ^ is a secured creditor of B, this implies a due process right to 
notice and hearing if, with court permission, B tries to settle with 
The court in In re Dow Corning Corp.p however, denied this 
33 11 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(7)(A) (2000). 
34 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rassmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751 (2002) (arguing this has become the true function of chapter 11). 
35 In Johns-Manville, B obtained proceeds from C and purported to "sell" them to a trustee in 
exchange for the trustee's promise to distribute the proceeds equally among the As. 837 F.2d 89 
(2d Cir. 1988). In other words, an assigmnent for the benefit of creditors was arranged in the 
middle of a chapter 11 proceeding. The court ruled that the proceeds were disposed of pursuant 
to § 363(f)(4), which permits sale of debtor assets free and clear of adverse interests if the adverse 
interests are in bona fide dispute. Id. When this is done, the bankruptcy court retains jiuisdiction 
to decide the dispute. Of course, if the imderlying rule is pro rata sharing, there is no real bona 
fide dispute as a matter of law, but there still might be as a factual matter, as the size of any one 
claim by A affects the security interest of any other A. In any case, the Johns-Manville court saw 
no jurisdictional impediment to administering the insurance proceeds on behalf of a surfeit of .4s. 
36 Merchs. Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925). 
37 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6). 
38 Id. § 545(2). 
39 Such settlements require court approval, when B is bankrupt. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a). 
40 198 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996). 
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proposition for any A who did not already have a judgment against B by 
the time of the bankruptcy petition. This implies that those with 
judgments against B (Aj) by the time of bankruptcy do have security 
interests already and are entitled to adequate protection of them'" 
against subsequent inroads by other As. At least one court has already 
found entitled to postpetition interest accruing against B v C.'^^ This 
in turn implies ^j's right to adequate protection against the appearances 
of yet other postpetition As, who might crowd y4j's claim against the 
insurance proceeds. 
There is probably no way to fit Aj into a coherent doctrinal vision. 
Courts will probably just ad hoc it and declare that, whereas Aj must 
have a judgment against B to perfect a direct action against C, Aj shares 
with all the other As who have no judgments, whenever B is bankrupt. 
B. Indemnity Policies 
Not all insurance contracts fall under the regulations described 
above. For example, in maritime insurance written under New York 
law,''^ C is permitted to write a "pay first" policy in which C is liable to 
A if and only if 5 has already paid A.'^ "Pay first" policies allow C to 
hide behind the insolvency of B and avoid paying on the policy for the 
benefit of A. Apparently, New York was unwilling to extend this rule to 
maritime policies for fear that New York companies would suffer 
competitive disadvantage, compared to other states.'*^ 
In addition to express indemnity contracts, indemnity is often 
implied into contractual relationships.'^® For example, if B employs C 
and C commits a tort against A within the scope of employment, A may 
sue B pursuant to respondeat superior, but C must indemnify B.*"^ An 
41 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000). 
42 See Baez v. Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
43 Maritime insurance contracts are governed by state, not federal maritime, law. See 
Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ftmd Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1955). But see Aasma v. 
Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, Inc., 95 F.3d 400, 404 (6th Cir. 1996) (reading 
Wilbum Boat as authorizing a federal rule when national uniformity is important). 
44 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(i) (McKinney 2003). For eases in which C could assert no liability 
because B did not pay A first, see Aasma, 95 F.3d 400; Conoco, Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 819 
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1987); Ahmed v. Am. S.S. Owner Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 993 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
45 Miller v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Co., 509 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
46 Araujo v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket S.S. Auth., 693 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 
1982) ("[A] contractual right to indemnification will only be implied when there are unique 
special factors demonstrating that the parties intended that the would-be indemnitor bear the 
ultimate responsibility for the plaintifTs safety, or when there is a generally recognized special 
relationship between the parties." (citations omitted)). 
47 Rosado V. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (N.Y. 1985). 
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implied term of the employment contract between B and C is C's 
promise to indemnify B for the cost of ^  v 5. 
There is also indemnity implied in law. "This is a tort-based right 
to indemnification found when there is a great disparity in the fault of 
two tortfeasors, and one of the tortfeasors has paid for a loss that was 
primarily the responsibility of the other.'"'^ Indemnity implied in law 
was created at a time when contribution between joint tortfeasors was 
not allowed.'^^ In modem times, when contribution is accepted for 
negligent torts, indemnity implied in law appears to be simply an 
extreme form of contribution. Nevertheless, the distinction between this 
kind of indemnity and ordinary contribution persists. In New York, 
contribution is govemed by New York General Obligations Law section 
15-108.50 In particular, section 15-108(c) provides: "A tortfeasor who 
has obtained his own release from liability shall not be entitled to 
contribution from any other person." Where B settles with A and then 
seeks indemnity from C, section 15-108(c) can be no impediment to 
indemnity, since indemnity is to be distinguished from contribution.^! 
Whenever C must indemnify B for A v B, Feldman payments may 
be made to provide the illusion that B has indeed paid A, thereby vesting 
5's indemnity right against C. As we have seen,^^ the Feldman 
payment is a sham—^yet New York courts have knowingly approved of 
this sham in order to transform indemnity into liability. Obviously, the 
difference between paying A through a Feldman payment and simply 
declaring that A is always already the assignee of 5 as a matter of law is 
purely formal. The New York law of indemnity and contribution is now 
apparently that, if A takes care to set up a Feldman payment, B can 
recover from C and fund the payment to A. But if A simply takes a 
direct assignment of 5's right, neither nor 5 recovers anything.^^ 
Such mindless insistence on formality is unworthy of the law. 
Courts should declare that Feldman stands for the proposition that A is 
always already "paid" by an inherent assignment of 5's right against C 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc., 782 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 
1986). See generally RESTATEMENT RESTITUTION § 96 (2003) ("A person who, without personal 
fault, has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is 
entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such 
liability."). 
49 This history is rehearsed in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972). 
50 This provision states that a release given to one of multiple tortfeasors will reduce a 
plaintifFs claim against the other tortfeasors by whichever is the greatest among: (1) the amount 
of the release; (2) the consideration paid for it; or (3) "the amount of the released tortfeasor's 
e q u i t a b l e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  d a m a g e s  u n d e r  [ C P L R  a r t i c l e  1 4 ] , .  . . . "  N . Y .  O E N .  O B L I G .  L A W  § 1 5 -
108(a) (McKinney 2003). Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1283 (N.Y. 1979). The 
purpose of § 15-108 is to encourage settlement. Rosado, 484 N.E.2d at 1356. 
51 Riviello, 391 N.E.2d 1278. 
52 See supra text accompanying notes 4-8. 
53 Precisely this was tried and was found wanting in Klinger v. Dudley, 361 N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 
1977). 
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over to A. Why make the parties go through the magic ritual of 
arranging for a paper payment? 
Nevertheless, courts do insist on the ritual. In Dicola v. American 
Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n (In re 
Prudential Lines, Inc.),^'* the Second Circuit acknowledged Feldman as 
part of New York law, but it uselessly insisted on a literal invocation of 
the required witchcraft. In Prudential Lines, C issued a "pay first" 
policy to B, covering up to $300,000 per tort. B also had numerous As 
whom B could not afford to pay. B's bankruptcy trustee lit upon the 
idea of paying Aj $300,000. Aj would then lend back this payment to 
B's estate, in exchange for a nonrecourse security interest against 
insurance proceeds. B would then use the proceeds of ^f's loan to pay 
A2, who would then lend back the proceeds for another nonrecourse 
security interest against insurance proceeds. This "recycling" process 
was repeated until the trustee owed $13 million in nonrecourse loans. 
The Prudential Lines court ruled that Ai et al. were not really 
"paid." Therefore, C had no liability. It nevertheless held open the 
possibility that B could go back and try again. If B could borrow the 
funds from someone other than A in order to accomplish payment of all 
the As, the court seemed willing enough to allow Feldman payments to 
erase the distinction between indemnity and liability.^^ Presumably no 
harm was done, as B's bankruptcy trustee could, upon the second 
attempt, invoke the precise magic spells and voodoo incantations that 
Feldman stupidly requires. 
In ruling that B had not paid A in Prudential Lines, the court 
distinguished the more sensible result in Liman v. American Steamship 
Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass 'n^^ In Liman, C issued a 
"pay first" policy to B with a $1,000 deductible per tort claimant. B had 
sufficient assets to pay all  the As, but i t  also had to pay $1,000 to the As 
out of its own pocket. Other creditors claimed this was a preference. 
The Liman court disagreed. It noted that, although A received a 
preferential $1,000, A returned this sum to B once B recovered from C 
and forwarded the proceeds to ^4. In effect B lent ^ $ 1,000 and A paid it 
back from proceeds later obtained (via B) from C. In contrast, in 
Prudential Lines B paid A and A lent that money back to B. In one case 
B was the lender and in the other A was the lender. Obviously the 
difference in cash flow was formal only, as no real cash ever changes 
hands in these recycling rituals. 
The Prudential Lines court announced itself unbound from Liman. 
Liman, it appeared, involved the financing of the deductible, whereas 
54 158F.3d65(2dCir. 1998). 
55 Accord United States Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (In re 
United States Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1999). 
56 299 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 417 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 
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Prudential Lines involved the funding of the whole claim. The purpose 
of the Liman deductible was simply to save C the bother of dealing with 
small claims. To arrange a paper transaction for a large claim in 
Prudential Lines did not therefore interfere with the purpose of the 
deductible. On the other hand, financing the whole claim meant that 
C's purpose would be defeated." And what was that purpose? Hiding 
like a coward behind J5's insolvency in order to leave the ^s 
uncompensated. 
This ignoble purpose should not be allowed. The very function of 
the Feldman payment is to prevent C from utilizing this strategy 
Nevertheless, the Prudential Lines court recognized Feldman as a 
valid statement of New York law. 
We think Feldman is no help to Claimants here because the non­
party lender in Feldman performed a real financial service for a real 
financial reward, whereas the recycling of funds by the Trustee here 
is an illusion; and the obstacle removed in Feldman was a doctrine 
(Klinger) that was intended to protect plaintiffs but in the 
circumstances had backfired to that plaintiffs detriment, whereas the 
obstacle faced by Claimants here is a bargained for contract clause 
that protects an insurer unwilling to waive it.^^ 
The Prudential Lines court therefore required the presence of some 
third-party lender. Such a party will always be available and so no real 
harm was done. Indeed, in Prudential Lines itself, the court virtually 
invited B to try a Feldman scheme to arrange for C's liability.^® 
Wouldn't it be more elegant for courts to recognize that the meaning of 
Feldman is that A always already has a secured claim on 5 v C?^' 
Looming over the entire Feldman scene is the intractable problem 
of worker's compensation. Suppose C employs A and A is injured by C 
In re Prudential Lines, 158 F.3d at 73. 
58 In Liman, B, though insolvent, eould have paid all the ^s, if preferential payment were 
permitted in bankruptcy. 299 F.Supp. 106. Therefore, according to the Pn/fifeM/ia/L/nes court, 5 
had incurred a loss in Liman, but not in Prudential Lines, where, the court ruled, B had no loss 
because it could not actually pay the ^ s. See In re Prudential Lines, 158 F.3d 65. This distinction 
is untenable. Since B is borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, what difference does it make whether 
B's bankruptcy estate theoretically could have financed a (preferential) payment in lieu of 
borrowing? In any case, it is far from clear that, in Prudential Lines, B could not have financed 
total payment of the ,fs. In Prudential Lines, the aggregate A claims were $13 million. If 
Prudential Lines had $13 million in unencumbered assets, then indeed the cases are absolutely 
undistinguishable. 
59 In re Prudential Lines, 158 F.3d at 75-76 (citations omitted). 
69 Id. at 71 ("At oral argument, the parties agreed that there are other available mechanisms 
(albeit less efficient) for triggering [C's] indemnification obligations. ... Given the availability of 
other payment mechanisms, the deductible issue and the allocation issue are of sufficient 
immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory judgment."). 
61 In In re Keck. Mahin & Cate, 241 B.R. 583, 596-97 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1999), the court 
declared that a chapter 11 plan's grant of unsecured creditor rights to A constituted payment, for 
the purpose of perfecting B's indemnity right against C. This is tantamoimt to what I have 
suggested should happen in every case of B's insolvency. 
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and B  jointly. If A  sues C, A  is under the regime of worker's 
compensation.^2 Nevertheless, if A can sue B in tort generally, and, so 
long as A has suffered a "grave injury,g ^ ay have contribution from 
C. This was the result of the well-known opinion in Dole v. Dow Chem. 
Co.64 
In Reich v. Manhattan Boiler & Equipment Corp.,^^ however, the 
New York Court of Appeals barred Feldman payments as a means of 
perfecting the contribution right, because the Feldman ruse was too 
subversive of the worker compensation system.^^ This opinion implies 
that C may hide behind the insolvency of B—in the name of workers' 
compensation. But where B is solvent and therefore has no need for the 
Feldman ritual. Dole implies that workers compensation does not 
protect C. 
It is not clear, however, that Reich really protects C very much. 
Suppose that B has $100 in unencumbered assets and $500 in claims 
against it. ^'s tort judgment against B is precisely $100. Such a B 
would appear to be "solvent" enough to pay A without a Feldman 
payment. Reich, it would appear, has bite in the narrow circumstance 
where B has no assets at all. 
II. LIABILITY 
Where indemnity is the theory, B  v  C i s  said to be contingent on B  
actually paying A. In such a case, Feldman payments are apparently 
necessary to transform indemnity into liability. But there is another, 
perhaps overlapping, theory. If C has committed a wrong against B— 
62 N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2003). 
63 The "grave injury" requirement was instituted by the New York legislature in 1996. M; 
see also Morales v. Gross, 657 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
64 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972). On the subversion of worker compensation legislation, see 
Mark C. Zebrowski, Comment, Indemnity Clauses and Workers' Compensation: A Proposal for 
Preserving the Employer's Limited Liability, 70 CAE. L. REV. 1421 (1982). In admiralty law, the 
Supreme Court famously permitted this evasion in favor of longshorepersons, who are subject to 
workers' compensation regimes. Longshore & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
905(b) (2000); Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 125 (1956) 
(B could have indemnity from C, where B hired C as stevedore); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 
328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946) {A, who worked for C, could sue B because fi's vessel was seaworthless). 
65 6 98 N.E.2d 939 (N.Y. 1998). 
66 Ironically, Feldman was a reaction to the unfairness on display in Klinger v. Dudley, 361 
N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 1977), which was a consolidated appeal involving several cases. In each of 
them, B assigned the right of contribution over to ^4 as a mode of paying A. The Klinger coiut 
insisted that A be actually paid by A—and not in the form of assigning the contribution right. One 
of the plaintiffs (Kaban) in Klinger was C's employee and barred by workers' compensation law 
from suing C directly. Twenty years after the auto accident, Kaban's attomey arranged a 
Feldman payment in order to generate C's liability to B. The Reich court refused to honor the 
Feldman payment in this one instance. 
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whether a tort or breach of contract—A's obligation to B is part of B's 
damages against C. Under the law of damages, proof that A has already 
been paid is not necessarily required. B is entitled to prove any future 
damage reasonably likely to occur. The fact that B has not yet paid A is 
irrelevant, so long as future payment is likely.^"' 
The difference between fiiture damages and indemnity becomes a 
vital consideration for statute of limitations purposes. If the theory is 
indemnity, 5's cause of action accrues only when B, at her leisure, pays 
A.^^ But if tort or breach of contract is the standard, the action accrues 
at some earlier time. 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc.^'^ 
shows just how difficult this distinction can be. In Goodpasture, B 
arguably incurred a "deadfreight" expense to A in 1974 because C 
refused to deliver grain. B resisted paying the deadfreight but was 
finally compelled to pay in 1981. B then sued C for indemnification. 
The Goodpasture court ruled that B had no indemnity theory. Sales 
contracts under Article 2 of the UCC do not give rise to an implied duty 
to indemnify. Rather, B had only a claim for consequential breach-of-
contract damages which accrued when C became liable to A for 
deadfreight in 1974. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had run.'''' 
In other words, the court expected B to plead the deadfreight expense 
long before B actually paid it. 
Accrual of a damage theory is fraught with metaphysical 
uncertainty. In Goodpasture, B v C accrued in 1974, when A v B 
accrued, not in 1981, when B paid A. In Torrez v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,''^ B's cause of action against C accrued only 
when yf's judgment against B was entered, not when AvB first accrued. 
Obviously, these rulings contradict each other. 
For example, in Lambert Houses Redevelopment Co. v. HRH Equity Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 
433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), A (a real estate owner) had a contract claim against B (the general 
contractor). B admitted liability to A and blamed C (a subcontractor) for the problem. B therefore 
had an action against C for breach of contract. The Lambert court permitted B to pursue C on 
behalf of/f, on the understanding that A would get the proceeds. This was permitted even though 
B had not yet paid A, but was certain to pay A because of the assignment of proceeds by B to A. 
E.g., McDermott v. City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980). 
69 782 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1986). 
16 See also IntT Siuplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 838 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 
1988) (C, an insurance broker lied to B; B issued too high a policy to A; B had a damage, not 
indemnity claim, against C; stamte of limitations had run); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 
780 (4th Cir. 1959) (5 loaded the truck; A drove the truck and was injured by negligent loading; 
shipper had indemnity action against C, the common carrier). 
•71 705 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1982). This seems to be based on the concept of the discovery 
rule—B did not know of the tort until the jury awards A the surplus amount. Where, however, B 
injures A and discovers that fi's insurance broker forgot to obtain insurance, B knew of his cause 
of action before the jury awarded anything to A, so that B's discovery precedes ^'s judgment. 
See Zamora v. Prematic Serv. Corp., 936 F.2d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 1991). 
72 Even within the Second Circuit, conflicting cases can be observed. In Bankers Trust Co v. 
Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), a cause of action accrued only when A sued B and 
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Just as Feldman presages the transformation of indemnity into 
liability, courts have, not always wittingly, striven to make liability into 
indemnity. This instinct is often on display in the cases invoking an 
insurer's good faith duty to settle a case within the policy limit of the 
insured. For example, suppose C issues a liability policy to B. B injures 
A. C takes charge of the defense in A v B. A offers C a settlement for 
the amount of i5's insurance limit. C declines, figuring that if the jury 
clobbers B, it is B, not C, who will pay the price. Meanwhile, if the jury 
acquits B, then C owes nothing. C captures the upside of the jury trial 
and forces B to take the downside. As the court in Pinto v. Allstate 
Insurance CoP put it: 
An insurer has an economic incentive not to settle, hoping a jury will 
bring in a verdict for less than the policy limits. But when such hope 
goes awry ... the insured is the loser, being personally responsible 
for the excess. These conflicting interests between the insurer and 
the insured cause them to mb against each other like unmoored 
rowboats on a placid pond.^^ 
In order to re-establish proper incentives in C, states commonly 
impose a tort duty on C for a bad faith duty to settle within the policy 
limits."^^ 
It often happens that, at the time of 5's tort against A, B is already 
insolvent. Whereas C may not gamble with B's money in refusing to 
settle, may C go ahead and gamble away when B has no money at all? 
Courts are divided on the effect of 5's insolvency on C's good 
faith duty to settle. A leading case is Harris v. Standard Accident & 
Ins. Co.P in which B (already insolvent) negligently injured A with his 
car. B's insurance company (Q refused to settle. A jury returned a 
verdict far exceeding the insurance limit. C paid the policy amount, 
leaving A substantially underpaid. 5's bankruptcy trustee sued C for 
bad faith refusal to settle within the policy limits. The Harris Court 
ruled that, because B had been discharged in bankruptcy, B no longer 
had any obligation to pay A. Accordingly, the trustee could prove no 
damages against the insurance company.^"' 
obtained a dividend from 5's bankruptcy. In Rhoades, C was a corporate officer who looted B. B 
filed for bankruptcy, and A spent a decade trying to get a dividend from B. A then sued C on a 
RICO theory. The Rhoades court ruled that A's cause of action accrued only when A received a 
final bankruptcy dividend from B, Id. Then and only then does A know the extent to which C 
harmed A. It may be observed that Goodpasture involved Bv C, whereas Rhoades involved A v 
C. Goodpasture, 782 F.2d 346. Nevertheless, it is not clear that Goodpasture and Rhoades can 
be reconciled. 
73 221 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2000). 
74 Id. at 396. 
75 In Young v. American Casualty Co. of Reading Penn., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969), a bad 
faith duty to communicate a settlement offer above the policy limits was found, over one dissent. 
76 297 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1961). 
77 Harris has been criticized in John E. Bagalay, Jr., Note, Damage to Insured by Unpaid 
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If, on the other hand, B had net worth at the time of the accident, 
then, the Harris court emphasized, B's bankruptcy trustee could collect 
the full face value of yf's claim7® In such a case, total payment of A is 
necessary to reestablish the net worth. For example, if B's net worth 
prior to the accident was $20 and A's claim was $100, B can recover 
$100 from C, according to the Harris court. Any other result threatens 
5's net worth. Suppose, for example, the court were to award only 
$20—the lost net worth. Then A, claiming $100, would obtain the $20 
award, and B would still be insolvent. Only if ^ is paid off entirely is 
5's net worth protected. 
The starkest of all the cases in which B was insolvent at the time of 
A V B is Bourget v. Government Employees Insurance CoA^ In this 
case, B negligently injured A and killed himself to boot in an accident. 
B's estate consisted only of the insurance proceeds for J5'S car. This 
humble amount was entirely consumed by funeral expenses and 5's 
meager widow's allowance, which had priority over ^'s judgment.^' In 
light of B's death and the utter dissipation of B's estate, C refused to 
settle, and the jury awarded a judgment far in excess of policy limit. A 
Connecticut statute made A subrogee to 5's tort action against C for the 
tort of bad faith refusal to settle. In the name of B, A sued C, claiming 
C had unwisely gambled on a jury verdict. The Bourget comt held: 
The basis for [the] duty to exercise good faith or due care with 
respect to opportunities to settle within the policy limits "is that the 
Judgment When Insurer Wrongfully Refuses to Settle Claim Within Policy Limits, 41 TEX. L. 
REV. 595 (1963) and James A. McDermott, Note, Action for Wrongful Refusal to Settle Claim 
Precluded by Bankruptcy of Insured, 60 MiCH. L. REV. 517 (1962); see also Note, Insolvency of 
Insured and His Discharge in Bankruptcy Precludes Recovery for Insurer's Wrongful Refusal to 
Settle, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 896 (1962); Note, Excess Liability of Insurer for Bad Faith Refusal to 
Settle, 30 FORDHAML. REV. 188 (1961). 
A different approach was taken in Bourget v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282, 285 
(2d Cir. 1972). In this case, B was killed in the accident with A. C refused to settle, and A 
obtained a judgment against B's estate far in excess of the policy limit. Because the estate of B 
was hopelessly insolvent, the court found there was no duty owing to B to settle. This seems 
different from the Harris conclusion that no damage existed. 
78 7/ams, 297 F.2d at 632. 
79 Accord Young v. Am. Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969); Levantino v. Ins. Co. of 
North Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1002 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1979) (where B was solvent before the 
first tort occurred, a jury could conclude that the face amount of yf's claim could be collected as 
future damages, without prior payment). 
In McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 (E.D. Mich. 1995), the court considered the claim 
of B's bankruptcy estate that C's malpractice led to B's liability in excess of covered amounts. 
Because of this B went bankrupt and was discharged. The court refused to let B recover the face 
amount of^f's claim, claiming that it could find no authority for it. Id. at 792. Yet the court also 
implied that B's bankruptcy trustee could recover for B's emotional injuries and the cost to B of 
litigating the bankruptcy, as these were caused by C's alleged malpractice. These went into the 
bankruptcy estate to enrich all the creditors of B. 
80 456F.2d282(2dCir. 1972). 
81 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-250 (2003); Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn. 329, 335 (1862) (expenses 
for funeral and settlement of estate rank before other debts of estate). 
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company has exclusive control over the decision conceming 
settlement within policy coverage, and company and insured often 
have conflicting interests as to whether settlement should be 
made . . [WJhat gives rise to the duty and measures its extent is 
the conflict between the insurer's interest to pay less than the policy 
limits and the insured's interest not to suffer liability for any 
judgment exceeding them. In the rare instance where the insured has 
no such interest, there can be no conflict and the duty does not 
a r i s e . . . .  
There could scarcely be a case where the insured's lack of 
interest in avoiding a judgment exceeding the policy limits was as 
clear as this one. [S] had no assets at all except his car. The 
insurance proceeds on this were completely consumed by claims to 
which Connecticut gave priority over [y4's]. Satisfaction of [^'s] 
claim was thus unnecessary to pass even a small amount to [5's] 
heirs. Counsel's suggestion that some asset now unknown might fall 
into the estate at some future time ignores reality. Since [5] was 
killed, the threat of a judgment hanging over him was nil.®^ 
The court made clear that if there had been net worth of even a 
dollar, the result would have been different. The duty of an insurance 
company to settle within policy limits is cast in terms of the exercise of 
judgment. C is supposed to give equal weight to 5's welfare as well as 
C's own welfare. Yet, in Bourget, only A's welfare was at stake. 
Bourget could stand for the not unreasonable proposition that C owes its 
duty to settle to B alone, not to A. Where B lies in his grave after life's 
fitful fever, why shouldn't C gamble on victory, where no further 
malice domestic can be visi ted on BI 
In holding B undamaged when C caused 5's excess liability to A, 
the Harris and Bourget courts equated 5's very personhood with net 
worth. Where B had no net worth, B was in effect not a person. Such a 
view of personhood, however grounded in modem habits of civility, is 
untenable in law. Suppose, for example, that instead of refusing to 
settle with A, C instead steals, smashes or otherwise converts B's car to 
its own use. Presumably no court would hear C to claim B undamaged 
because the car would have gone to 5's creditors. Or, if C physically 
injures B and B incurs medical expenses, C could not argue that B was 
not really harmed, since any tort award would simply go to 5's 
creditors. 
Furthermore, in our modem utilitarian age, it is usually alleged that 
the very purpose of tort law is to provide proper incentives for C to 
behave properly. A mle that denied the very personhood of insolvents 
would invite C to commit torts at will, so long as their consequences are 
Bourget, 456 F.2d at 285 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
^3 Id. (citing Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 295, 296 (4th Cir. 1961) (Maryland 
law)). 
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calculated to visit insolvents only. 
Corporate scholars discovered twenty years ago that a corporation 
is merely a "nexus of contracts."^'* The postmodern instinct is to view 
corporate existence as in no sense different from human personhood. 
Both are purely legal ideas. If a corporation is a nexus of contracts, 
then so is every human being. So viewed, every person is a fiduciary 
for his creditors. He is bound to use his human and financial capital and 
his very body to make sure that his creditors are paid. In harming any 
of these things, C stands as an obstacle to the performance of 5's 
fiduciary duty to her creditors. Accordingly, C should bear liability, 
even when the entire judgment goes to pay JB'S creditors. 
But one need not rest on the undecidable metaphysics of 
personhood to show that Bourget and Harris are wrong. Although cases 
like Bourget present the strongest imaginable case for letting C off the 
hook because B is insolvent, nevertheless even 5's estate in Bourget 
could have made a Feldman payment. The beauty of secured lending is 
that even the poor can borrow, if they have collateral. And 5's estate 
always has collateral—^namely, BvC. In Bourget, X (A's lawyer) could 
have lent the amount of ^ v 5 to 5's estate. B's executor could have 
pledged 5 v C to Xas collateral. 5's administrator could then have used 
those fimds to pay A. A could have guaranteed Jfs repayment and could 
have posted the payment from 5's estate as collateral. 5's estate would 
then have generated an out-of-pocket loss that makes incontrovertible 
the fact that B has been damaged by Cs wrong. In short, just as 
Feldman tums indemnity into liability, it should stand against the 
instinct inherent in Harris and Bourget, to tum liability into indemnity. 
Bourget and Harris aside, a majority of jurisdictions^^ hold that, in 
the good faith settlement environment, B may recover the face amount 
of A V B, even if A has not been paid.^® Even in New York, Harris and 
Bourget have been superseded in Pinto v. Allstate Insurance Co.,^' 
For a history of the phrase, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The 'Nexus of Contracts' 
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). 
Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
86 Gray, 871 F.2d at 1131 (North Carolina law); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963) (Arkansas law); Wolfberg v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 240 
N.E.2d 176, 180 (111. App. Ct. 1968) ("The rule of damage is that incurrence is equivalent to 
outlay."); Wooten v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Carter v. Pioneer 
Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188 (1981); see Annotation, Insured's Payments of Excess Judgment, 
or a Portion Thereof as Prerequisite of Recovery Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Failure 
to Settle Claim Against Insured, 63 A.L.R.3d 627, 641-69 (1975 & Supp. 1986). In Wolkowitz v. 
Redland Insurance Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), A v B was settled without Cs 
participation by motion of B's bankruptcy trustee. The court ruled that the B v C had no value 
b e c a u s e  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  b e  t r u s t e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  o i A v B  ( e v e n  t h o u g h  C  
was given the opportunity of intervening to prevent the settlement). Wolkowitz is quite 
questionable in its outcome, because C had the contractual obligation to assume defense of ^ v B 
and was in breach of that obligation. 
87 221 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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where B had "no assets."^^ The courts following the "liability" position 
give a variety of reasons for rejecting Harris and its ilk. For example, it 
is said that, where A has a judgment against B, this will follow 5 all 5's 
life, unless A is paid off. This very possibility of future harm justifies 
C's liability where A has not yet been paid.^^ "An insured may be 
damaged by the effect on his credit of an outstanding claim where he 
cannot pay it."^" This instinct has been extended to cases where B has 
been killed in the course of injuring A, since 5's death should not 
adhere to C's benefit.^' A better view of the matter, however, is that no 
matter how insolvent or dead B is, the estate of B always has the power 
to borrow the funds needed to pay A. Given the mere possibility of 
secured lending, courts should simply erase the distinction between 
indemnity and liability. 
But this raises the possibility that B will already be discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding before A is actually paid. How does bankruptcy 
discharge affect Feldmanl I take this question up in the next section. 
III. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
The Harris rule invites C to hide like a coward behind the skirts of 
B's insolvency in order to avoid its tort liability. The Harris court 
implied that B's discharge in bankruptcy had something to do with 
this.^2 That is to say, given the fact of 5's discharge, B owes A nothing 
and therefore C has not damaged BP 
Id. at 402. Presumably this means relatively minor non-exempt assets, or, at least 
insolvency in light ofA's judgment. The Pinto court proceeds as if B was definitely insolvent. 
Id. 
89 Carter V. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ohio 1981). 
99 Jenkins v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assiuance Corp., 212 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Mass. 1965). 
91 Wolfberg, 240 N.E.2d at 180. One court foimd a contractual waiver against any reference 
to S's insolvency, even in 5's tort suit against C. Maguire v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 866 
(D. Del. 1972). Presumably, insurers have learned from Maguire and now write policies that 
make no such imnecessary waivers. 
92 Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Since [B has] 
been discharged from paying the excess judgment, [5] will not suffer any damages if recovery is 
denied."). 
92 Two complex cases have recently decided or held open the possibility that R's discharge 
terminates C's indemnity obligation. 
In Chapman v. Bituminous Insurance Co. (In re Coho Resources, Inc.), 345 F.3d 338 (5th 
Cir. 2003), A had a Mississippi judgment against B. B arguably had an indemnity policy from C 
and an excess liability policy from D. Both A and D had an interest in establishing that discharge 
is no necessary impediment to indemnity. In Coho, A obtained a jury verdict against B in 
Mississippi state court. B made post-trial motions to reduce the verdict. While these motions 
were pending, B filed a bankruptcy petition. Not knowing this, the Mississippi cotirt ordered 
remittitur of the jtiry award to a lower amoimt (meaning that there would be a new trial if A did 
not accept the lower amotmt). A accepted the lower amount and obtained writs of garnishment 
against C and D. C and D removed the garnishments to federal court. About this time, fl's 
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There are a great many reasons why this suggestion must be 
rejected. First, the implication of Harris contradicts at least the spirit of 
Bankruptcy Code § 524(e): "[ejxcept as provided in subsection (a)(3) of 
this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability 
of any other entity on, or property of any other entity for, such debt."^'' 
Superficially, this section may not seem to implicate the Harris 
facts, where C tortiously injured B by causing A v B. Section 524(e) 
applies only if C is liable for B's debt (as where C is a surety). In 
Harris, C owed nothing to A for the debt of B. Rather, C was a 
tortfeasor that owed a duty to B only. 
But suppose, following my thesis, that A is deemed the secured 
creditor of B, with 5 v C as her collateral. On this premise, it can be 
seen that § 524(e) applies quite directly. C is liable directly to A 
because, according to what I have suggested, A is the assignee of 5 v C. 
bankruptcy proceeding resulted in a confirmed chapter 11 plan. Provided the plan was not a 
liquidating plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3), confirmation implies that A v B was discharged. 
Pursuant to the district court's suggestion, A moved for permission from the bankruptcy court to 
garnish C. The bankruptcy court denied permission because A never filed a proof of claim in 5's 
bankruptcy. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit properly held the proof of claim to be irrelevant. The 
key was the discharge. The Fifth Circuit elected to let the district court in Mississippi, sitting in 
d i v e r s i t y ,  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  5 ' s  d i s c h a r g e  m e a n t  t o  . 4 ' s  a t t e m p t  t o  g a m i s h  B v C .  
Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc., is even more complicated. 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 894 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2002), affd, 64 Fed Appx. 827 (2d Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 934 (2003). In Bank of India, C committed a lender liability tort against B. As a result, B lost 
all net worth and owed a substantial amount to A. B sued C in the district court while A sued B 
b e f o r e  a n o t h e r  j u d g e  i n  t h e  s a m e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  B  t h e n  i m p l e a d e d  C ,  s o  t h a t  t w o  c o u r t s  h a d  B v C  
before them. The second judge suspended his version of B v C, and the first action proceeded to 
trial. In this first action, the court excluded any evidence from A v B. A jury awarded B a 
substantial sum, representing 5's loss of new worth. See also Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 
47 F.3d490(2dCir. 1995). 
Rather than pay the jury award to 5, C instead interpleaded the amount, tying up the funds. 
Since 5 intended to use these funds to finance the recovery of ^4 v 5 damages from C, 5 filed a 
bankruptcy petition to regain control of the fiinds. In this bankmptcy proceeding, a liquidating 
plan was confirmed. Although § 1141(d)(3) makes clear that there can be no discharge, the plan 
nevertheless purported to discharge 5. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2000). The plan authorized the 
bankmptcy court to determine the amount of A v B and to authorize 5 to recover the X v 5 
damages from C for distribution primarily to A. 
Meanwhile, Av Bv C was still pending before the second district court judge. This second 
judge mled that 5 was precluded from proving A v B damages because this should have been 
done in the first case, where 5 won a jury verdict. This was properly reversed, because the first 
judge would not permit these damages to be proved. Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc., 
239 F.3d 428 (2d Cir. 2000). 
On remand, the second district court had a new reason why B could not prove X v 5 in an 
action against C. Because 5 had supposedly been discharged in a chapter 11 plan, 5 did not owe 
A and therefore had not been damaged by C. Bank of India therefore follows Harris on the 
meaning of the bankmptcy discharge. This interpretation of the discharge was upheld on appeal 
(in an unpublished opinion). See Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc., 64 Fed. Appx. 827 (2d 
Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 934 (2003). Presumably, it should still be possible for the 
bankmptcy court in Trendi to suspend the discharge injimction to permit 5 to prove A v B 
damages against C. 
Although Harris is a pre-Code case, even the old Bankmptcy Act of 1898 codified the 
principle of § 524(e). Bankmptcy Act of 1898 § 16, 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1976) (repealed). 
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The meaning of § 524(e) is that C may make no reference to 5's 
d i s c h a r g e  f r o m  A v B  a s a  r e a s o n  w h y  C  s h o u l d  n o t  h a v e  t o  p a y  B v  C .  
There are other reasons to think that Harris embodies an incorrect 
concept of discharge. According to pre-Code law, bankruptcy discharge 
was conceived as preventing the remedy without denying the existence 
of the debt itself. According to the Supreme Court in Kessler v. 
Department of Public Safety?^ 
[A] discharge does not free the bankmpt from all traces of the debt, 
as though it had never been incurred. This Court has held that a 
moral obligation to pay the debt survives discharge and is sufficient 
to permit a State to grant recovery to the creditor on the basis of a 
promise subsequent to discharge, even though the promise is not 
supported by new consideration. The theory, the Court declared, is 
that "the discharge destroys the remedy but not the 
i n d e b t e d n e s s "  . . .  
What Kessler implies is that debts exist after they have been 
discharged.^^ Accordingly, B can make a Feldman payment to A even 
after B is discharged. Discharge, then, is never an excuse for C to assert 
B\ insolvency as a reason for not paying, whether the underlying 
theory is indemnity or liability. 
The Kessler principle is largely forgotten today because § 524(c) 
prohibits any contract to affirm a discharged debt unless the agreement 
pre-dates the discharge itself and the court has approved the 
reaffirmation agreement. Nevertheless, the Kessler principle is 
legislated directly into the Bankruptcy Code itself, in a passage rarely 
cited and little noticed. According to Bankruptcy Code § 524(f), 
"[njothing contained in subsection (c) or (d) of this section prevents a 
debtor from voluntarily repaying any debt." Section 524(f) expresses 
the ancient notion that discharged debts are still debts, and they can be 
paid.^^ A historic discharge, then, should have no effect on a Feldman 
95 369 U.S. 153, 170-71 (1962). 
9® Id. (citing Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 629 (1913)); see also Houston v. Edgeworth (In 
re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the 
debt itself, but merely releases the debtor from personal liability for the debt."). For histories of 
this principle, see A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 453-54 
(1975); Kevin M. Teeven, Origin and Scope of the American Moral Obligation Principle, 46 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585 (1998). 
97 It has been suggested that the true soul of discharge is the consensual creditor composition, 
which eventually became mandatory, rather then consensual. See John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: 
The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 185 (1996). 
The law of composition was that discharge was contingent on the debtor paying the agreed-upon 
consideration. Accordingly, the mere fact of the composition could not mean that the debt had 
disappeared. It continued to exist, even after the composition agreement was exercised. 
98 Perhaps §524(e) makes the same point. See Guy B. Moss, The Risks of Purchasing and 
Collecting Consumer Debt, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 643, 645 (2002) ("[B]ecause the 
discharge is personal to the debtor and the debt is not canceled, it does not affect the liability of 
third parties to the holder of the claim." (footnote omitted)). 
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strategy. 
Even if KessleEs view of discharge is ignored, we have already 
seen that discharge constitutes an injunction against debt enforcement, 
but this injunction can be lifted for the benefit of A. Courts have even 
insisted that the injunction be lifted, or that non-bankruptcy courts 
simply ignore the discharge for the purpose of establishing a judgment 
in A V B, provided this judgment is enforced against C only.^^ These 
cases fully apply in any indemnity or liability case with regard to 
Feldman payments. And if Feldman payments are possible and easy to 
achieve, then courts should simply lay to rest the very distinction 
between indemnity and liability whenever B is insolvent. Or, even if 
they insist on seeing the Feldman ritual actually performed, discharge 
provides no reason why this voodoo ritual should not be performed. 
Finally, if courts recognize that A has a lien on 5 v C, then A's 
claim against B is not discharged but rather constitutes a nonrecourse 
secured claim against B. The Supreme Court itself has affirmed that 
creditors rendered nonrecourse by discharge of 5's personal liability are 
nevertheless creditors of 5.""' If A is conceived as B's nonrecourse 
creditor claiming 5 v C as collateral, then A can still be "paid," for 
indemnity or liability purposes. It therefore follows that bankruptcy 
discharge cannot possibly serve to shield C's liability to A, who is 
inherently the assignee of 5 v C. 
IV. ASSIGNMENT AND RELEASE 
If liability, not indemnity, is the theory, B's insolvency can never 
shield C from liability for the simple reason that B can assign B v C over 
to AI^^ Liability, of course, turns on the ability to prove that future 
damages are more l ikely than not to occur.  That is ,  B must prove that  A 
is  l ikely to be paid.  Yet when B assigns B v C over to A, payment of A 
is absolutely certain to occur, and this element of B's case is proven by 
the very fact of the assignment. 
Commonly, B assigns B v C io A in exchange for /I's release of B 
5ee jM/7ra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
'00 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). In Johnson, a debtor with a mortgaged 
farm filed for chapter 7 and received a discharge. He then filed a subsequent chapter 13 case, 
where he hoped to cram down the secured creditor in a reorganization plan. The secured creditor 
responded that, because of the discharge, it was no longer a "creditor" and was therefore immune 
from cram down. The Supreme Court rejected this claim. Id. 
Many courts permit a debtor to reinstate security agreements after chapter 7 discharges. 
Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow {In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 
1997). These cases, too, assume that payment of the nonrecourse secured party constitutes a 
genuine "payment" that prevents the conclusion that the security agreement is in default. 
101 New York courts have called this a "liquidating agreement" between A and B. Lambert 
Houses Redevelopment Co. v. HRH Equity Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
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from any further liability. In the context of an insurance company's 
good faith duty to settle A v B within 5's policy limit, many courts have 
ruled that B may validly assign B v Cto A, m exchange for 's release 
of 5.102 
But if A has released B in exchange for this assignment, does this 
not mean that  B v C has no value,  because 5 's  release portends that  B 
has no liability to A and was therefore not damaged? At least one court 
has so concluded. In Pemo v. For-Med Medical Group, P.C.,io3 the 
court viewed A's release as proof that B v C had evaporated, thereby 
defeating the assignment which B executed in exchange for the release. 
In Pemo, C was a trio of doctors who allegedly committed malpractice. 
B was the medical group that employed C. A was a victim of C's 
malpractice. A had a respondeat superior cause of action against B, 
which had an indemnity right against C. 
After A brought her claim against B, B filed for bankruptcy. B 
assigned its indemnity right against C to A "expressly renounceft'io^ 
any bankruptcy dividend from B. The court ruled that A had "released" 
B from liability, thereby foreclosing 5's claim for indemnity.'"5 
The Perno court must be criticized—and severely so—for 
imposing a harsh trick on A and B that they could hardly have expected. 
Obviously, B intended to "pay" A by assigning to A the proceeds of 5 v 
C. In effect, A agreed to be a nonrecourse creditor with a claim of an 
asset of B. A and B were not seeking to enrich C. 
If a Feldman payment had been made in Pemo, the court would 
102 See Haugh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2003); Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 
F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2000); Torrez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 
1982); MacArthur Bros. Co. v. Kerr, 107 N.E. 572 (N.Y. 1915); Ardsley Constr. Co., Inc. v. Port 
of New York Auth., 403 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). But see Lambert Houses, 502 
N.Y.S.2d at 435 (warning that release is inconsistent with the assignment). 
103 673 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1998), appeal dismissed, 679 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998). 
104 See Perno, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 852 ("Despite the fact that [A], in entering into the bankruptcy 
settlement agreement, retained the right to pursue her action against [5] to judgment, and despite 
the fact that she might conceivably be entitled to a money judgment against [5] based on [B]'s 
vicarious liability for the torts of one or more of the defendant doctors, [A] expressly renounced 
any right to execute a judgment against [A], so as to subject [B] to any out-of-pocket loss."). 
113 Contribution was also ruled out by New York General Obligations Law §15-108(c), which 
provides: "A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from liability shall not be entitled to 
contribution from any other person." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §15-108(c) (McKinney 2003). 
In Gonzales v. Armac Indus., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 261 (N.Y. 1993), A was C's employee. A 
sued B and B sued C—but on a contribution (not indemnity) theory only. .4 and B settled. 
According to their agreement, B was released "except as {Feldman^ loan arrangements may be 
necessary to permit [A] to collect any monies from [C\ in the event that there is an apportionment 
of liability against [C] by the jury." Id. at 262. The comt ruled this was a release nevertheless, 
within the meaning of New York General Obligations Law §15-108, with the effect that B had 
forfeited all right to contribution from C. Id. 
Gonzales has no impact on the apparently separate theory of indemnity, which does not fall 
under the rule of § 15-108, but we have already seen the New York Court of Appeals abolishing 
Feldman whenever C is A's employer. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
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have been compelled to recognize that BvC was a valuable right which 
A could validly collect. Why should such a bad result follow just 
because this ritual was not performed?'"^ 
In fact, the assignment in Perno should have been analyzed as 
follows. Since B assigned to A in exchange for a release, the 
assignment should be deemed an "asset pajonent"—that is, a transfer of 
an asset in satisfaction of a debt. Ordinarily, one thinks of "payment" as 
the transfer of United States currency. But there is no reason why some 
other asset might not satisfy a debt. In chapter 11 bankruptcies, asset 
payments are even common.'O'' For example, where a debtor has 
mortgaged premises to a secured creditor, the debtor might write a plan 
that deeds the equity to the secured creditor in satisfaction of the 
secured claim. "W^en this occurs, the creditor has received an "asset 
payment."^"^ 
Similarly, in Perno, A was paid by means of B's asset. The asset in 
question was BvC. True, 5 v C is valuable only if A has been paid. 
The very assignment to A should accomplish A's payment. Or, in 
liabil i ty (as opposed to indemnity) terms, the assignment proves that  A 
i s  c e r t a i n  t o  b e  p a i d ,  t h e r e b y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f B v C .  
To look at it from another perspective, suppose, in Perno, that B 
had granted a lien to A on B v C, in exchange for a release. In this 
transaction A has not been "paid"—only "secured." A would then be a 
nonrecourse creditor of B. Non-recourse creditors of B are still 
creditors.io^ Certainly a Feldman payment could be made to vest 5's 
indemnity right against C. 
If a secured transaction is a valid way to vest A with the right to 
collect from C, then how sensible is it to bar the asset payment version 
of the deal? Perno, then, must be rejected as a cruel hoax on A that is 
by no means theoretically required.'i" 
V. THE NEED FOR 5'S VOLUNTARY ACT 
The Perno decision aside, courts seem willing enough to honor the 
106 Presumably, A could still sue C directly for malpractice without relying on assignment of 
the indemnity cause of action. There is no hint in the Perno opinion of whether this is possible or 
not. 
107 See GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 17, § 8.03[c]. 
108 Colorfully, the above-described chapter 11 plans have been nicknamed "eat dirt" plans—a 
phrase even less pleasant than "cram down." In re May, 174 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. S D Ga 
1994). 
109 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (2000) ('"claim against the debtor' includes claim against property of 
the debtor"). 
110 For a case following Perno, see Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 894 (S.D.N.Y. January 18, 2002), aff'd, 64 Fed Appx. 827 (2d Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 
124 S. Ct. 934 (2003). 
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assignment of 5 v C. To the extent this suffices without the formal 
performance of a Feldman payment, courts effectively recognize that A 
is 5's secured creditor with a claim io B v C. But the assignment 
requires the cooperation of B to execute the assignment formalities. 
This problem of 5's voluntariness is generally also a problem with the 
Feldman payment. Payment is a voluntary act^^'—B never has to pay. 
What happens if B is not in the mood to cooperate? 
Here is why courts should view the Feldman payment as 
accomplished in advance, and B v C should be viewed as assigned to A 
by operation of law. Why should the will of B stand in the way of this 
result? This is especially inappropriate in insurance cases where B 
typically assigns the defense oIAv B over to C. It can be observed that, 
as an insolvent, B has a fiduciary duty to maximize her estate for the 
benefit of creditors. All the creditors benefit if B voluntarily assigns B v 
C to ^ or voluntarily pays A and then collects B v C from C. Equity 
courts are accustomed to viewing as done what ought to be done."^ 
Given this fiduciary duty, the law should view A as always already 
p a i d — a l r e a d y  t h e  a s s i g n e e  o f B v C .  
That A is 5's secured creditor in 5's bankruptcy is already 
established directly by the UCC in a narrow band of cases. According 
to UCC section 2-722: 
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been identified 
to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury to a party to that 
contract: 
(a) a right of action against the third party is in either party to 
the contract for sale who has title to . . . goods ...; 
(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not bear the 
risk of loss as against the other party to the contract for sale and 
there is no arrangement for the disposition of the recovery, his 
suit or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary 
for the other party to the contract; 
(c) either party may with the consent of the other sue for the 
benefit of whom it may concem. 
Section 2-722 presupposes that^l and 5 jointly have some property 
interest in goods subject to a sales contract, whether it be "title, a 
security interest, or an insurable interest in the goods, or maintains risk 
of loss with respect to the goods.""^ if so, then either A can sue C 
111 E.g., United States v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 359 U.S. 314, 318 (1959). 
112 E.g., Meddaugh V. Wilson, 151 U.S. 333, 345 (1884). 
112 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy 
Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1110 (2d Cir. 1990). In Crysen, A sold oil to B and B resold to C. C refused 
to pay the full price because C claimed it did not receive all the oil B claimed to deliver. B then 
filed for bankruptcy, giving rise to an automatic stay. A nevertheless sued C, claiming 
authorization to do so under UCC § 2-722. The Crysen court ruled that A had no cause of action 
against C under the authority of § 2-722, because A had no property interest in the goods 
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directly,! or B can do so, as fiduciary for Section 2-722 "is 
designed to overturn the rule prevailing in some jurisdictions that only 
one party could hold title to goods, and only that party had standing to 
sue a third party for damage to the goods."' 
Where section 2-722 applies, A is deemed to be the assignee of 5 v 
C. Accordingly, whether J or B is the plaintiff, neither needs to prove a 
pre-existing payment to A in order to recover. It is precisely this 
instinct that I argue must apply in any indemnity or liability case, where 
B is insolvent. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued that the New York courts have 
abrogated the dist inction between indemnity and liabil i ty.  Where B 
owes A and C owes B, and where the payment of A is the condition 
precedent to B v C, B is invited to enter into a secured transaction which 
allows for the payment of A without any real transfer of capital. Given 
that this illusion is fully permitted, it is time for the courts to confess 
that the distinction between indemnity and liability is a false one that 
should be entirely erased. 
themselves, after they were sold to B. Id. Rather BvC belonged to B  alone. 
114 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ortiguera, 583 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
115 Thus, 5's settlement with C binds A. Mitsui & Co. (USA) v. Hudson Tank Terminals 
Corp., 790 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1986); IntT Harvester Credit Corp. v. Valdez, 42 Wash. App. 189, 
709 P.2d 1233, 1236 (1985); cf. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Bank of Forest, 368 So. 2d 1273 (Miss. 
1979) (C owed duty to A not to release insurance proceeds to B, where A had a security interest 
on the insured collateral). 
115 Mitsui & Co. (USA) v. Hudson Tank Terminals Corp., 790 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1986); 
see also Ross Cattle Co. v. Lewis, 415 So. 2d 1029 (Miss. 1982) ("The effect of [§ 2-722] is that 
third parties will be liable for conversion, physical damage to goods, or interference with the 
buyer's rights in goods."). 
